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POSTCARDS FROM THE BORDER: A 
RESULT-ORIENTED ANALYSIS OF 
IMMIGRATION REFORM UNDER THE 
AEDPA AND IIRIRA 
SARA A. MARTIN* 
During all these long years the man watches the doorkeeper 
almost incessantly. He forgets about the other doorkeepers and this 
one seems to him the only barrier between himself and the Law . ... 
Finally his eyes grow dim and he does not know whether the world 
around him darkens or whether his eyes are only deceiving him. 
But in the darkness he can now perceive a radiance that streams 
inextinguishable from the door of the Law. . . . "What do you want 
to know now?" asks the doorkeeper. ... ''Everyone strives to attain 
the Law, " answers the man, "how does it come about, then, that 
in all these years no one has come seeking admittance but me?" 
The doorkeeper perceives the man is coming to an end and that 
his hearing is failing, so he bellows in his ear: ''No one could gain 
admittance through this door, since this door was intended for you. 
I am now going to shut it. ''I 
The adjectives "Orwellian," "Kafkaesque," and "draconian" have 
been used to describe two new immigration reform laws passed by 
Congress in 1996.2 Republican members of Congress pushed for tough 
immigration laws in response to national fears of terrorism, overpopu-
lation, and unemployment.3 These new laws expanded the litany of 
* Senior Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL. 
I FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 240 (1977). 
2 Journalist Bill Maxwell responded to the application of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act in the Tampa Bay area by writing, "'Orwellian' best describes the nightmarish 
quality of two immigration cases being litigated in the Tampa Bay area. . . . [T] he lives of 
immigrants ... may become more Kafkaesque before they improve." Bill Maxwell, Enter Here, 
and Abandon Basic Rights, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 28, 1997, at ID. Jeanne Butterfield, 
Executive Director of the American Immigration Lawyers Society, described the recent immigra-
tion legislation in similar terms as, "Draconian laws." Mike Swift, Immigrants Rushing to Citizen-
ship, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 2, 1997, at AI. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the 
Immigration Refurm Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons fur 
Citizens and Non-Citizens, 28 ST. MARY'S LJ. 833, 839 (1997). 
g See Johnson, supra note 2, at 838-39; William Branigin, Si/!TTa Club Debates Immigration, 
THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Mar. 8, 1998, at A13; see also Michelle Mittelstadt, Wash-
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crimes for which aliens can be summarily deported, eliminated waiver 
of deportation relief, and precluded judicial review of certain depor-
tation orders.4 
On the one-year anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing, 
President Clinton signed into law the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 5 The AEDPA amended the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (INA) 6 by changing the definition of an 
aggravated felony and adding to the list of crimes that constitute that 
offense.' As a result, aliens convicted of aggravated felonies now are 
barred from applying for relief from deportation.s The U.S. Attorney 
General's office has been allowed little discretion to ensure fairness 
and prevent unconscionable results.9 Further, the AEDPA establishes 
mandatory detention provisions for aliens convicted of criminal of-
fenses who are seeking entry, re-entry or waiting for a deportation 
hearing following conviction.1O Moreover, the Act operates retroac-
tively, so that aliens are suddenly subject to deportation for crimes 
committed decades ago that now constitute aggravated felonies under 
the AEDPAl1 Because many of these crimes were not grounds for 
deportation when committed, aliens may have been encouraged by 
counsel to plead guilty in order to avoid deportation for more serious 
allegations.12 
ingtcm Retreats in '97 from Some of '96lmmigraticm Pruvisicms, AsSOCIATED PRESS POL. SERV., Nov. 
30,1997. 
4 SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 875-76 (final deportation orders based on criminal deporta-
tion grounds not subject to judicial review); see also Frank Trejo, FW Woman Trying. to Fight 
Husband's Deportaticm to Mexico, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 13, 1996, at 39A [hereinafter 
Trying to Fight Husband's Deportaticml. 
5 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 839; see also Robert Plotkin, First Amendment Challenges to the 
Membership and Advoca9 Provisions of the Antiterrorism and Efftctive Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
10 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 623, 625 (1996). See gmeraUy Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
6 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1994). 
7 For a detailed discussion of these provisions, see discussion infra Part IIA. and accompa-
nying notes. 
8 See Julie K. Rannik, Comment, The Anti-Terrorism and Efftctive Death Penalty Act of 1996: 
A Death Sentence for the 212(c) Waiver, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 123, 125 (1996). 
9 See id. at 133; see also Jules E. Coven, Changes to Grounds of Exclusicm and Deportaticm: 
Changed Dejiniticm of "Aggravated Felony" and New Bars for EM's and Overstays Under the Antit-
errorism and Efftctive Death Penalty Act of 1996,964 PLI/CoRP. 93, 101-02 (1996). 
10 See Coven, supra note 9, at 101-03. 
11 See Frank Trejo, The Lcmg, Lcmg Arm of Immigraticm Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 
18,1997, at 1A [hereinafter Lcmg Arm of Immigmticm Law]. 
12 See id. 
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Shortly after the passage of the AEDPA, Congress passed a second 
act containing even more provisions limiting alien rights and making 
deportation and exclusion much easier.13 President Clinton signed 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) into law on September 30, 1996.14 The IIRIRA effectively 
eliminates judicial review of deportation orders based on criminal 
convictions, bars re-entry for individuals overstaying their visas, author-
izes expedited removal orders by immigration officers at ports of entry, 
and blocks avenues by which deportation orders can be suspended or 
waived by denying federal court jurisdiction. 15 In addition to the ques-
tionable constitutionality of many of the IIRIRA's provisions, the en-
forcement of these provisions is causing immigrant groups to form 
coalitions and lobbies in order to pressure members of Congress to 
reconsider the harsh effects of the laws. I6 Legal scholars have attacked 
provisions of the AEDPA and IIRIRA as violations of principles of 
international law and the First Amendment. I7 
The first section of this Note describes some of the extreme hard-
ship cases that have arisen since the inception of these Acts, explores 
the current political climate and ultimately illustrates the inherent 
unfairness and impracticality of the current state of the law. These 
stories poignantly demonstrate how the specific provisions of the new 
laws are impacting real people. Moreover, these accounts set the stage 
for an exploration of the constitutional hurdles for both advocates and 
proponents of the new legislation and help to explain why immigration 
lobbies are pressuring members of Congress to curb the harsh effects 
of the AEDPA and IIRIRA. 
The second section of this Note analyzes some of the most egre-
gious provisions of these Acts in a constitutional light and addresses 
the inherent tension between alien rights and the plenary power of 
Congress over immigration. Most importantly, this section demon-
13 See Rex B. Wingerter, Dramatic & Draconian Changes in U.S. Immigration Laws, ETHIOPIAN 
REv. 68 (Apr. 30, 1997). 
14 See Carol Leslie Wolchok, Demands and Anxiety: The Effects of the New Immigration Law, 
24 HUM. RTS. 12, 12 (1997). 
15 See id. 
16 See Mittelstadt, supra note 3; Long Arm of Immigration Law, supra note 11. 
17 Although these arguments are beyond the purview of this Note, it is interesting to note 
that attacks on the AEDPA and IIRIRA are presenting themselves on several fronts. See gmerally 
Bobbie Marie Guerra, Comment, A Tortured Comtruction: The Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act's Express Bar Dmying Criminal Alims Withholding of Deportation Defies 
the Principles of International Law, 28 ST. MARY's LJ. 941 (1997); Plotkin, supra note 5 (discussing 
potential Constitutional challenges to the AEDPA). 
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strates that the recent changes to immigration law do not effectively 
target the problem areas identified by Congress and discusses recent 
litigation over the AEDPA, focusing on the IIRIRA's new "exclusive 
jurisdiction" provision. 18 
The third section of this Note suggests changes to the AEDPA and 
IIRIRA. These suggestions attempt to resolve the major problems origi-
nally targeted by the reform movement, but avoid the establishment 
of overly inclusive and draconian immigration laws, such as those 
currently enacted under the AEDPA and IIRIRA. 
I. THE EFFECTS OF THE NEW IMMIGRATION LAWS 
A result-oriented analysis of these immigration laws is particularly 
needed because the laws themselves eliminate judicial review and most 
of the discretion formally exercised by immigration judges.19 There-
fore, even the most unfortunate and unfair cases are now absolute, 
permanent, and unreviewable.20 Additionally, the results of deportation 
cases affect the individuals involved, both directly and indirectly, in the 
most fundamental ways.21 Deported aliens often lose everything that 
"makes life worth living," including their families, friends, community, 
jobs, and religious freedom.22 In the most extreme cases, deported 
aliens fear for their personal safety and self-preservation.23 Entering 
with improper documentation, a common practice for asylum seekers, 
is now a mandatory bar on entry or re-entry.24 The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) has the authority to remove or exclude 
such individuals without a hearing or an appeaJ.25 Asylum seekers must 
18 See infra Part II.C. 
19 See Rannik, supra note 8, at 124. 
20 See id; see also Wolchok, supra note 14, at 12-13 (quoting American Bar Association's 
GoverI)mental Affairs Director, Robert D. Evans); Trying to Fight Husband's Deportation, supra 
note 4. 
21 See generally Wolchok, supra note 14. 
22 See Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity: Championing Notions of 
Social Contract and Community TIes in the Battle of Plenary Power Versus Aliens' Rights, 41 VILL. L. 
REv. 725, 763 (1996) (community ties that aliens make while residing in another country should 
be used as a basis for determining when deportation exceptions should be made). Justice Louis 
Brandeis once wrote that deportation may deprive an individual of "all that makes life worth 
living." Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
23 See Wingerter, supra note 13, at 68. 
24 See id. (presenting false documents may also have criminal consequences and to avoid the 
penalties associated with document fraud, the asylum seeker must succeed in the asylum appli-
cation process). 
25 See id. 
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establish a "credible fear" of persecution during an interview. 26 Once 
"credible fear" is established, the asylum seeker is detained for further 
consideration.27 
Deportation also affects those left behind, often U.S. citizens, by 
banishing their loved ones, tearing families apart, and eliminating any 
economic support the deported alien provided.28 One immigration 
scholar has noted that although notions of family unity have been 
afforded constitutional recognition and protection when applied in 
other areas of law, "it is not clear that the right to family unity with-
stands an attack by U.S. immigration law. "29 
A. Specific Hardship Cases 
Martin Munoz, a thirty-seven-year-old Mexican native, spent five 
months in the Denton County Jail in Texas awaiting his deportation 
hearing while his wife worked adamantly for his release.30 Munoz is 
married to a U.S. citizen and supports three children and four step-
children.sl His wife and step-children view the future with fear and 
uncertainty.32 On December 11, 1997, Martin Munoz was deported 
under a provision of the AEDPA that expanded the list of criminal acts 
which constitute aggravated felonies and mandate deportation.33 The 
crime for which Mr. Munoz was deported occurred in 1990.34 He had 
already served a sentence of five years of probation and 160 hours of 
community service.35 
The story originates in 1990, when Rosalia Munoz called the 
police to her house with the hope that they would place her intoxicated 
husband in a "drunk tank" until he was sober.36 In all likelihood, it was 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 See Trying to Fight Husband's Depuration, supra note 4. 
29 Kelly, supra note 22, at 730. A number of Supreme Court cases protected the sanctity of 
the family as an institution "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." See id. at 730 
(quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). In Moure, the Court held 
that the extended family's right to live together was a liberty interest protected under the Due 
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 431 U.S. at 499, 502, 504-06 (Powell, j., 
plurality opinion). 
!!O See Trying to Fight Husband's Depurtation, supra note 4; Long Arm oj Immigration Law, 
supra note 11. 
31 See id. 
32 See Trying to Fight Husband's Depurtation, supra note 4. 
33 See id. 
34 See id.; Lung Arm oj Immigration Law, supra note 11. 
35 See id. 
36 See Long Arm oj Immigration Law, supra note II. 
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a phone call that Rosalia Munoz has lived to regret. The police arrived, 
and after an officer pushed Mr. Munoz over a couch, a scuffle ensued.37 
The incident resulted in Mr. Munoz's conviction for aggravated assault 
on a police officer.38 After serving his probationary sentence and com-
pleting community service, Mr. Munoz received a letter assuring him 
that the conviction had been removed from his record.39 
Seven years later, Mr. Munoz was arrested for public intoxication.40 
Instead of merely spending the night in jail, however, Mr. Munoz was 
denied bail and detained for the entire five months preceeding his de-
portation hearing.41 He was subsequently deported under the AEDPA 
for a past crime which was not a ground for deportation under the 
prior version of the INA.42 Mr. Munoz's appeal was summarily rejected 
by a federal court under a provision of the IIRIRA eliminating judicial 
review of such cases.43 Although Rosalia Munoz has spent hours on the 
phone with her husband's attorney searching for a solution, there is 
little she or others can do to prevent the deportation of family mem-
bers under the new laws.44 
Daniel Kozuba, a Canadian native who came to the United States 
at age five, found himself in a similar predicament.45 His story begins 
over ten years ago, when he suffered with a drug addiction which led 
to three arrests and one conviction.46 Although Kozuba faced deporta-
tion after his release from a state prison in 1993, he convinced an 
immigration judge to grant him a waiver of deportation, a discretion-
ary relief no longer available under the new laws.47 The INS appealed 
37 See id. 
!l8 See id.; Trying to Fight Husband's Deportation, supra note 4. 
!19 See Lung Arm of Immigration Law, supra note 11. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
42 See Trying to Fight Husband's Deportation, supra note 4. For a more complete explanation 
of the differences between the current and former states of immigration law, see discussion infra 
Part II. 
43 See Trying to Fight Husband's Deportation, supra note 4; see also Wolchok, supra note 14, at 
12 (provision bars federal court review of final deportation orders based on criminal convictions). 
44 See Trying to Fight Husband's Deportatiun, supra note 4. 
45 See Lung Arm of Immigraticm Law, supra note 11. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. The waiver of deportation relief that was available under INA section 212(c) and 
the suspension of deportation relief that was available under INA section 244(a) were consoli-
dated into the "cancellation of removal" provision under section 240(A) of the IIRIRA. See 
William C.B. Underwood, Note, Unreviewable Discretiunary Justice: The New Extreme Hardship in 
Cancellatiun of Deportation Cases, 72 IND. LJ. 885, 892 (1997). This new provision requires a 
showing of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship," 10 years of continuous physical 
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the waiver, but while the appeal was pending, the AEDPA was passed 
and his case was reversed.48 Much like Mr. Munoz, Mr. Kozuba is 
married to a U.S. citizen, and his familial and community ties exist 
within the United States.49 As Mr. Kozuba explained, "I thought I had 
proved myself. I have gotten my life together. And now they want to 
take everything away from me .... I can't imagine going back."50 
On May 19th of the same year that both Mr. Munoz and Mr. 
Kozuba faced deportation, Mazen AI-Najjar, a forty-year-old Palestinian 
refugee and American-educated engineer, was handcuffed while hav-
ing breakfast with his family and transported to an undisclosed loca-
tion.51 He subsequently was placed in an INS holding facility in a 
Manatee County, Florida jail and denied bail under a provision of the 
AEDPA which allows the government to use informant testimony and 
"secret evidence" to detain and deport suspected terrorists.52 The use 
of such evidence often renders deportation hearings mere formalities, 
and the final orders of such hearings cannot be appealed or reviewed. 53 
AI-Najjar was never permitted to see the evidence against him, nor has 
he been formally charged with any crime.54 
Sharon Rowe:Johnson tells the story of her brother's devastating 
encounter with the new deportation legislation.55 Sharon and her 
brother emigrated from Jamaica more than twenty-five years ago.56 Her 
brother retired from the U.S. Navy in 1996 following a twenty-year 
career which included service in the Persian Gulf War. 57 He was jailed 
in September of 1997 and faced a deportation order following a rou-
tine background check conducted pursuant to his 1996 application for 
citizenship. The background check uncovered a 1983 conviction for 
marijuana possession inJapan.58 INS officials explained that the agency 
presence within the United States, and a showing of good moral character. See id. For a compari-
son to the former law, see discussion infra Part II. 
48 See Lung Arm of Immigration Law, supra note 11. 
49 See id. 
5OId. 
51 See Maxwell, supra note 2; Trying to Fight Husband's Deportation, supra note 4; Lung Arm 
of Immigration Law, supra note 11. 
52 See Maxwell, supra note 2. 
53 See id; see also Underwood, supra note 47, at 893-94. 
54 See Maxwell, supra note 2. 
55 See Swift, supra note 2. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
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had no choice but to apply the mandatory deportation rules promul-
gated by the recent immigration reform legislation.59 
B. A Turbulent Political Climate 
True stories illustrate the inherent flaws in the approach Congress 
is taking with respect to immigration law and policy. 60 In these individ-
ual cases, in which the application of the draconian legislation is 
unconscionable, government officials have little opportunity to exer-
cise discretion, and deported or excluded aliens have no opportunity 
for judicial review of the deportation hearing.61 Moreover, aliens wait-
ing for a deportation hearing can be detained indefinitely without the 
protection afforded to citizens detained for criminal offenses under 
the Constitution.62 
Even officials within the INS recognize the devastating potential 
of the AEDPA and IIRIRA.63 In its final report to Congress on Septem-
ber 30, 1997, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform described 
the retroactive application of the new laws to old offenses as "manifestly 
unfair."64 While INS Commissioner Doris Meissner conceded the im-
portance of targeting criminal aliens for deportation, she also argued 
that the laws may require adjustment to provide the INS greater dis-
cretion.65 Meissner stated that "[t]he new laws affect a broad class of 
people with any kind of criminal history. . . . But to eliminate, as 
Congress did, all discretion, was an overreach." Meissner also noted 
that the effects of the laws will require close scrutiny: "There's an 
evolutionary process here. We have to see some of these things in 
practice before we know what's working and what isn't."66 
The results thus far indicate that the laws are not working. Ethnic 
and immigrant groups, as well as opponents of the legislation within 
the legal and academic communities, are responding.67 "There is a 
growing awareness that the law went too far," says Lucas Guttentag, 
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union immigrant rights pro-
59 See itl. 
60 See Swift, supra note 2. 
61 See Underwood, supra note 47, at 887, 894-95. 
62 See Wo1chok, supra note 14, at 13. 
63 See Swift, supra note 2; Long Ann of Immigration Law, supra note 11. 
64 Swift, supra note 2. 
65 See Trying to Fight Husband's Deportation, supra note 4. 
66 Id. 
67 See Swift, supra note 2. 
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ject.68 The Caribbean-American Network of Democrats (Caribnet), has 
created a non-political fund to help support the families of, and pay 
legal fees for, local immigrants facing deportation.69 INS offices have 
initiated information campaigns in an attempt to educate the immi-
grant population about the new requirements and provisions.70 How-
ever, Rosemary Moreno, Executive Director ofEI Concilio Immigration 
Project in Fresno, California, says the INS should have initiated a radio 
and outreach program prior to the passage of the new legislation.71 
"Immigration needs public relations to make their work easier .... If 
people are educated, it will make the work easier for everybody. People 
are coming to INS offices unprepared," Moreno complains.72 
In response to a growing awareness of the new immigration laws, 
resident aliens are applying for citizenship in unprecedented num-
bers.73 However, Republican supporters of the strict measures adopted 
through the AEDPA and IIRIRA cite recent immigration statistics as 
evidence of the laws' success.74 Deportation statistics have increased 
dramatically since the new legislation was passed.75 Nearly 112,000 
criminal and other illegal immigrants were deported from the U.S. in 
the fiscal year 1997, as compared to approximately 69,000 in 1996.76 
Republican Senator Spencer Abraham, who chairs the immigration 
subcommittee and authored parts of the new laws, stated during a re-
cent speech on the Senate floor that "[o]ur goal was to deport con-
victed criminal aliens starting with the thousands currently in our jails 
AI. 
Id. 
68 Long Arm of Immigration Law, supra note 11. 
69 See Swift, supra note 2. 
70 See id. 
71 See Karla Bruner, INS Rules Cunfront Worried Immigrants, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 31, 1997, at 
72Id. 
73 See Swift, supra note 2. 
For a nation built on the assimilation of foreigners, this is an unparalleled time for 
the making of Americans .... Between 1991 and 1997, naturalization petitions by 
immigrants increased nearly eightfold, from about 200,000 a year to a record total 
of more than 1.5 million in the just-<:oncluded federal fiscal year. More immigrants 
applied to become citizens in fiscal 1997 than in the entire decade of 1911-20, one 
of the heaviest immigration periods in the 20th century. 
74 See Naftali Bendavid, Depurtations up As INS Tries to Please Congress, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 
1997, at 5. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. The INS reported that in the city of Chicago alone, deportation of illegal immigrants 
rose from 441 during the fiscal year 1996, to 1,181 in 1997. See id. 
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and prisons .... Law-abiding people, not hardened criminals should 
be filling our priceless immigration slots. "77 
Senator Abraham and other supporters of the recent immigration 
reform have minimized the harsh results, characterizing them as an 
INS effort to undermine the legislation by aggressively pursuing the 
minor cases to prove a point.78 As an example of supporters' reponses, 
Dan Stein, Director of the Federation for American Immigration re-
form, has stated that: 
The INS has been weakening the law at every point, and vir-
tually any provision that inconveniences aliens here is under 
attack from various immigration lobbies .... 79 You shouldn't 
torpedo a sound policy because there are a few hardship 
cases .... With 30 million people who want to move to the 
country tomorrow, why do you want to let in people of bad 
moral character?80 
The uproar over the new legislation also is affecting the political 
climate on local and nationallevels.81 Immigrants who fear deportation 
have applied for citizenship in unprecedented numbers and some 
Republicans fear that this new body of voters will dilute their majority 
in Congress.82 Additionally, lobbying efforts by immigrant advocacy 
groups have resulted in the relaxation of several of the laws' provi-
77 Long A nn of Immigration Law, supra note 11; see also Trying to Fight Husband's Deportation, 
supra note 4, (Senator Abraham echoing similar sentiments on the goals of the new laws). 
78 See Trying to Fight Husband's Deportation, supra note 4. 
79 Long Ann of Immigration Law, supra note 11. 
80 Swift, supra note 2. To remedy the hardship cases, Stein offers the following: 
Maybe we should look at the miniscule number of cases where more discretion 
might be in order, but before we do that, I'd like to see a much stronger effort on 
the administration of deporting individuals who do in fact commit serious crimes 
and under our laws have forfeited the right to stay in our communities .... It's 
hard to understand why the INS and Meissner can't handle those very exceptional 
cases on an administrative basis. Meissner appears to be more interested in finding 
a way to seriously weaken and damage the integrity of the provisions mandating the 
deportation of criminal aliens than in making the new law work. 
Trying to Fight Husband's Deportation, supra note 4. 
81 See Swift, supra note 2. 
82 See id. For example, Republicans in California and Texas charged that during the 1996 
campaign, the Clinton administration "was plotting to make new Democratic voters by naturaliz-
ing large numbers of immigrants. " Id. History suggests that Republican fears may be well founded. 
See id. Gary Gerstle, a historian at Catholic University who studies the effects of immigration, 
reported that similar restrictions supported by Republicans in the 1920s caused a surge in 
naturalization, producing a larger Democratic party voting body that ultimately facilitated the 
passage of President Roosevelt's New Deal. See id. 
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sions.83 For example, Congress approved a compromise measure allow-
ing illegal immigrants whose permanent residency applications were 
filed by January 14, 1998, to remain in the United States while the 
government processes their paperwork in exchange for a $1,000 fine. 84 
President Clinton also approved a safe harbor provision for Cen-
tral Americans who sought asylum in the U.S. during the past decade 
from civil wars in their home countries.85 The safe harbor provision 
makes Nicaraguan and Cuban refugees automatically eligible for legal 
permanent residence.86 The provision also allows those from El Salva-
dor, Guatemala and Eastern Europe to apply for the suspension of 
deportation relief that was available under the old version of the INA, 
but was subsequently eliminated by the AEDPA.87 
In late December 1997, President Clinton instituted a rarely used 
"deferred enforced departure" order to postpone the deportation of 
eligible Haitians for at least one year while the Executive Branch works 
with Congress to produce "a long-term' legislative solution. "88 Eligible 
Haitians are those who applied for asylum prior to December 31, 
1995.89 Congressional sources estimate that the safe harbor provision 
will affect as many as 400,000 Central Americans and between 30,000 
and 40,000 Haitians.9o 
Moreover, in the past two years since the AEDPA and IIRIRA were 
passed, the INS has found it necessary to invoke the Transition Period 
Custody Rules (TPCR) to suspend the full application of the manda-
tory detention requirements.91 This measure allowed the INS and the 
immigration courts to release a lawfully admitted alien who was deport-
able for a criminal offense after considering the nature of the offense, 
the likelihood the person would appear for further proceedings, and 
what danger the person posed to the communityY2 
83 See Mittelstadt, supra note 3. 
84 See Michelle Mittelstadt, Immigration Curbs Ease, but Debate Still Grows, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Nov. 14, 1997, at 34. 
85 See id. 
86 See id. 
87 See id; see also Branigin, supra note 3, 
88 Branigin, supra note 3. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See INS ReJorm: Detention Issues: BeJUTe the Subcomm. on Immigration oj the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 104th Congo (1998) (testimony of Doris Meissner, Commissioner, INS). 
92 See id. The TPCR did not apply to aliens who committed certain serious criminal offenses 
and was initiated due to the INS' lack of detention capacity and personnel to fully implement 
the IlRiRA detention requirements. See id. At the time of her testimony, Meissner believed that 
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II. SPECIFIC CHANGES MADE BY THE NEW IMMIGRATION LAws 
The specific problems that require immediate attention and ad-
justment can be identified by comparing immigration law before the 
passage of the AEDPA and IIRIRA to the present state of the law. While 
making this comparison, it is important to keep in mind the danger 
and permanence of the unfair results of the AEDPA and IIRIRA. 
A. Provisions Affecting Criminal Aliens 
The new laws have dramatically increased the types and degrees 
of crimes that can result in mandatory deportation.93 Primarily, the 
definition of an "aggravated felony," which is grounds for deporta-
tion, has been expanded.94 Section 436 of the AEDPA amends section 
241 (a) (2) (A) (i) (II) of the INA by extending deportation to aliens 
convicted of a crime of moral turpitude within five years of their date 
of entry, for which a sentence of one or more years is statutorily 
permitted, regardless of whether the alien is actually sentenced to any 
time at all.95 Under the prior provision, the alien must have been 
actually sentenced to one year or more in order to invoke a deporta-
tion proceeding.96 Therefore, the prior provision usually did not ex-
tend to minor offenses, such as first-time shoplifting convictions, and 
incorporated the judicial discretion and fairness exercised throughout 
a criminal proceeding.97 
Additionally, various provisions of the AEDPA amend section 
11 01 (a)( 43) of the INA by adding to the list of aggravated felonies.98 
This new definition is much broader than under commdn criminal law 
statutes.99 This provision was expanded to include gambling offenses,100 
the INS continued to lack sufficient detention capacity and would have to continue exercising 
the discretion allowed under the TPCR. See id. 
93 See Wingerter, supra note 13. 
94 See Coven, supra note 9, at 95-98. 
95 See id. at 95-96. 
96 See id. at 96. 
97 See id; Wingerter, supra note 13. 
98 See Wingerter, supra note 13. 
99 See id. 
100 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (a)(43) a> (West Supp. 1998) as amended by The Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act ofl996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 § 440(e)(1); Wingerter, 
supra note 13. 
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transportation for prostitution,101 alien smuggling,102 illegal entry or 
re-entry if the alien has a past conviction for an aggravated felony,103 
document fraud,104 commercial bribery,105 obstruction of justice106 and 
failure to appear before a court for a felony charge. 107 
This indicates that the changes instituted do not necessarily en-
courage the deportation of only hardened criminals or those who pose 
serious threats to safety, as supporters of the legislation claim. 108 Provi-
sions for deporting such individuals were already available under the 
old legislation. 109 Ironically, the new provisions target perpetrators of 
less serious technical offenses and those whose sentences were com-
muted or suspended due to mitigating circumstances weighed during 
their criminal trials. lIO 
The retroactive application of the new criminal alien provisions is 
proving to be one of the most unfair and unnecessary aspects of the 
law. 111 Individuals applying for naturalization in response to the new 
101 See Coven, supra note 9, at 96-97. The INA requires that the conduct involve a "commer-
cial advantage." See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(k)(ii) (West Supp. 1998), as amended by The Antit-
errorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ofl996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, llO Stat. 1214 § 440(e)(2). 
102 See Coven, supra note 9, at 97. Section (N) applies if the defendant receives a sentence 
of five years or longer, regardless of whether the sentence is suspended. See 8 U.S.CA. 
§ 1101 (a)( 43) (N) (West Supp. 1998), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, no Stat. 1214 § 440(e)(3), § 321(a)(3). 
103 See 8 U.S.C.A. § nOI (a)(43)(O), created by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, no Stat. 1214 § 440(e)(7); Coven, supra note 9, at 97. 
104 See Coven, supra note 9, at 97-98. Document fraud is an aggravated felony if the defendant 
receives a sentence of twelve months or longer. See 8 U.S.C.A. § nOI (a) (43)(P), created by The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
§ 440(e) (5),(6), § 321 (a)(9). Also, under the IIRIRA, immigration officers at ports of entry will 
have the final authority to deport aliens arriving without documents or with false documents 
under an "expedited removal order." See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-546 
(1996). 
100 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(R) (West Supp. 1998), created by The Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (when the term of 
imprisonment is at least one year); Coven, supra note 9, at 98. 
106 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43)(S) (West Supp. 1998), created by The Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (includes peljury or 
subordination, or bribery of a witness for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year); 
Coven, supra note 9, at 98. 
107 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (a) (43)(T) (West Supp. 1998), as amended by The Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 § 440(e)(8). This new 
section (T) applies to appearances for felonies for which a sentence of two years or more may 
be imposed. See Coven, supra note 9, at 98. 
lOB See Swift, supra note 2. 
109 See discussion infra Part III. 
110 See Rannik, supra note 8, at 124-30; Swift, supra note 2. 
111 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936, 946-47 (Feb. 
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legislation, but who have past convictions for acts which constitute 
felonies under the new law, have found themselves trapped. 112 Similar 
to the case of the retired naval officer, some aliens who choose to apply 
for naturalization are finding that, instead of becoming U.S. citizens, 
"armed INS agents are appearing in the early morning hours ... to 
arrest and deport them. "113 Therefore, this policy clearly discourages 
naturalization, while encouraging certain aliens to remain "illegal. "114 
The expanded definition of deportable criminal acts alone reflects 
unsound and draconian policy-making. However, the retroactive appli-
cation of such laws, coupled with the mandatory detention of criminal 
aliens awaiting deportation or exclusion orders, borders on being an 
unconstitutional violation of due process. 115 Like most constitutional 
challenges to immigration legislation, however, any due process claim 
will have to address the plenary power doctrine, an age-old theory 
affording Congress exclusive and virtually unchecked power over im-
migration matters. 116 
The plenary power doctrine states simply that Congressional auth-
ority over matters of immigration is absolute and unchecked. ll7 The 
U.S. Supreme Court has explained, 
For reasons long held as valid, the responsibility for regulat-
ing the relationship of the United States and our alien visitors 
has been committed to the political branches of the Federal 
Government .... Over no conceivable subject is the legisla-
tive power of Congress more complete than it is over the 
admission of aliens.IIB 
1999) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), codified version ofIIRIRA "exclusive jurisdiction" provi-
sion, applies retroactively). But see Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 126-27 (1st Cir. 1998)(hold-
ing that Congress did not intend for the AEDPA's § 440(d) restrictions on § 212(c) relief from 
deportation to apply retroactively), Henderson v. Reno, 157 F.3d 106, 128 (2d Cir. 1998) (same). 
See also Long Ann of immigrati(fTI Law, supra note 11; Wingerter, supra note 13. 
112 See Swift, supra note 2. 
mWingerter, supra note 13; see also Lung Ann of immigratiun Law, supra note 11. 
114 See id. 
115 See Dulce Foster, Note, Judge, Jury and Executiuner: INS Summary-Exclusiun Puwer Under 
the Illegal immigrati(fTI Reform and Respunsibility Act of 1996,82 MINN. L. REv. 209,210-11 (1997). 
116 See generaUy Anne E. Pettit, Note, One Manner of Law: The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis 
and the immigratiun Law Plenary Puwer Doctrine, 24 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 165 (1996). The plenary 
power doctrine is essentially an extra-constitutional theory which asserts that exclusive federal 
legislative authority over matters of immigration is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. See id. at 
173. Analogizing this power to war and foreign affairs powers, the Supreme Court has claimed 
little authority to review such legislative decisions. See id. 
117 See id. at 169-70. 
118 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 791-92 (1977) (citations omitted). 
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Consistently, both the Supreme Court and lower courts have inter-
preted this doctrine to allow the application of congressional rules 
to non-citizens that would be unconstitutional if applied to citi-
zens.119 
As early as 1886, however, the Supreme Court held in Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins120 that "there is a notion of fundamental human rights that 
protects individuals" regardless of citizenship or alienage status.12l This 
case became the "foundation of the aliens' rights tradition. "122 Yet, the 
broad language of the holding in Yick Wo, that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was "not confined to the protection of citizens," but rather was 
"universal in application" to all persons regardless of nationality, skin 
color, or race, was interpreted narrowly in cases that followed. 123 These 
cases held that the same degree of scrutiny should be applied to a legal 
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment made by an alien as to a 
claim made by a citizen, so long as a matter of immigration was not 
involved.124 Therefore, in matters of immigration, the plenary power 
doctrine still reigns. 125 
For example, in Duldulao v. INS,126 the Ninth Circuit upheld ret-
roactive application of provisions of the AEDPA which eliminated the 
jurisdiction of a federal Court of Appeals to review an alien's final 
deportation order. 127 The court's reasoning touched upon two mcyor 
po in ts.128 First, the court found the new statutory elimination of judicial 
review was purely jurisdictional, rather than substantive in nature. 129 
Therefore, the presumption that newly-enacted statutes affecting sub-
stantive rights or obligations only apply prospectively was not invok-
ed. 1!10 
119 See Fiallo, 430 V.S. at 792; Auguste v. Reno, 118 F.3d 723, 726 (11 th Cir. 1997); Duldulao 
v. INS, 90 F.3d 396, 399 (9th Cir. 1996). 
120 See generally 118 V.S. 356 (1886). 
121 Rannik, supra note 8, at 130; see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century 
o/the Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Nurms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE LJ. 545, 
566 (1990) (crediting Yick Woand its progeny with the establishment of an alien individual rights 
doctrine to counter the plenary power doctrine). 
122Kelly, supra note 22, at 739. 
128 See id. (quoting Yick Wo, 118 V.S. at 369). 
124 See id. at 739 n.77. 
125 See id. at 745. 
126 See 90 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996). 
127 See id. at 398. 
128 See id. at 396-98. 
129 See id. at 399. 
uo See id. at 400. 
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Second, the court held that the provision of the AEDPA denying 
judicial review of certain final deportation orders did not offend either 
the doctrine of separation of powers or due process rights. 131 The court 
relied heavily upon the plenary power doctrine's rich historical prece-
dent, reasoning that "the power of Congress to regulate ~he admission 
of aliens and to define the jurisdiction of lower federal courts defeated 
each asserted basis of unconstitutionality. "132 Additionally, since the 
Supreme Court has long held that "deportation is not a criminal 
proceeding and has never been held to be punishment ... no judicial 
review is guaranteed by the Constitution."133 
This reasoning defeats challenges to the legality of detention 
under immigration laws as well.134 Aliens who are detained for months 
while awaiting a deportation order are not being criminally "punished" 
such that any constitutional rights are being violated. 1115 The reality, 
however, is that the conditions and consequences that detained aliens 
are forced to endure are often far worse than criminal punishment.136 
Moreover, there is often little or no information made available to the 
detained alien concerning the length of, or basis for, the detention. 137 
B. Bans on Waivers and Suspensions of Deportation 
Another provision of the new legislation, making life more dif-
ficult for criminal and non-criminal aliens alike, is the elimination of 
the various forms of discretionary relief that were available under past 
versions of the INA138 The section 212(c) waiver, a form of relief 
UI See Duldulao, 90 F.3d at 398. 
152Id. at 399. 
U5Id. at 400 (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952». 
154 See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 537-38. 
135 See id. 
156 See Wolchok, supra note 14, at 13 (for example, mandatory detention results in overcrowd-
ing oflocaljails and, consequently, in transporting detained aliens to remote locations). 
157 Compare U.S. v. Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1027 (E.D. La. 1997) (permanent detention 
unconstitutional), with Trans v. Caplinger, 847 F. Supp. 469, 474-76. (W.D. La. 1993) (indefinite 
detention constitutional). See also Louis Freedberg, An Anti-Terrorism BiU that Went Way Too Far, 
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 17, 1997, at 7. Daniel Magana-Pizano, a 25 year-old Mexican immigrant was 
detained at an INS detention facility in Eloy, Arizona for over 15 months, earning one dollar a 
day doing household chores. See id. Most of his time, however, was spent doing nothing but 
waiting for his day in court. See id. This day finally came in October 1998 and resulted in a Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruling declaring that the elimination of all avenues of judicial review of 
executive decisions violates the Constitution. See William Branigin, Court Makes It Harder to Deport 
Criminals. WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1998, at A2. The decision allows Magana-Pizano to pursue his 
claim for a waiver of deportation and to avoid immediate deportation. See id. 
138 See Rannik, supra note 8, at 124-25. 
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available before the passage of the AEDPA, allowed immigration judges 
to exercise discretion where removal of a particular criminal alien may 
not have been appropriate. 139 Most criminal aliens could petition an 
immigration judge for a "waiver of deportation" under section 212(c) 
of the INA140 Aliens eligible141 for such relief were granted hearings 
which evaluated the fundamental fairness of deporting a particular 
alien.142 Aliens who had significant ties to the U.S. and were facing 
deportation for a relatively minor crime were often granted relief 
under this provision.143 Under the INA, the immigration judge was 
required to "balance the adverse factors indicating the alien's undesir-
ability as a permanent resident with the social and human considera-
tions presented on his behalf. "144 The Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) established factors to be considered by an immigration judge 
granting section 212(c) relief, including: nature and grounds of exclu-
sion, significance of immigration law violations, existence of a criminal 
record, family ties with the U.S., duration of residence, and evidence 
that hardship would incur upon the alien's family if deportation was 
ordered.145 A careful consideration of these factors allowed immigra-
tion judges to weigh the alien's overall value to his community and 
friends against any danger posed to society.146 Because immigration 
judges across the country often exercised their discretion with varying 
degrees of leniency, the BIA was given the authority to review the 
decisions de novo to preserve uniformity.147 
"Suspension of deportation" relief under section 244 of the INA 
was also available to aliens facing deportation. l48 Prior to the passage 
of the IIRIRA, such relief was available in cases where the alien could 
1~9 See id. at 124. 
140 See id. 
141 Aliens were eligible for section 212(c) waivers if they maintained lawful unrelinquished 
domicile for seven consecutive years and were not convicted of one or more aggravated felonies 
for which a sentence of five years was served. See id. at 134. 
142 See id. at 129. 
14~ See Rannik, supra note 8, at 134-35. 
144 Id. at 135; see also Matter of Marin, 161. & N. Dec. 581, 581 (BIA 1978). 
145 See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. at 584-85. Other factors included service in the Armed 
Forces, employment history, property and business ties, value to the community, proof of reha-
bilitation, and evidence of good or bad character. See id. 
146 See Rannik, supra note 8, at 135. 
147 See id. at 137-38. A Miami immigration judge recalled granting only four or five section 
212(c) discretionary waivers over a three and one-half year period; however, the Executive Office 
of Immigration Review statistics reveal that more section 212 (c) waivers were granted than denied 
during the years 1989-1991 and 1994-1995. See id. at 136-37 n.80. 
148 See Underwood, supra note 47, at 892. 
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demonstrate that deportation would result in "extreme hardship" to 
the alien or a u.s. citizen or permanent resident who is the alien's 
spouse, parent or child.149 The standard for aliens deported for more 
serious offenses was "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" 
under section 244 (a) (2).150 
In 1994, the "suspension of deportation" relief provision was 
amended by adding a third paragraph to section 244(a) which lowered 
the standard for suspending deportation for battered spouses and 
children.151 The new standard required only a showing of three years 
of continuous residence and good moral character.152 
Unfortunately, the IIRIRA consolidated the relief provisions un-
der sections 212(c) and 244(a) into the "cancellation of deportation" 
provision under section 240(A).l5!I Although section 244(a) (3) was pre-
served under 240 (A) (b) (1), the 244(a) (1) "extreme hardship" stand-
ard was replaced by the stricter "exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship" standard. In addition, the new provision requires a ten year 
period of continual presence and a showing of good moral character.154 
Section 244(a) (2) relief was eliminated altogether.155 Therefore, there 
are no longer differing standards to accommodate aliens convicted of 
less serious crimes, and many aliens will not be eligible for any relief 
at all since they have been present for less than ten continuous years.156 
Although the ten year continuous residence requirement attempts to 
accommodate aliens with strong U.S. ties, it is both an overinc1usive 
and underinc1usive standard. 157 Prior to the passage of the IIRIRA, the 
immigration judge was able to consider actual ties, regardless of the 
the length of continuous residence, so that aliens who came to the U.S. 
in order to be reunited with family members would be considered 
149 See id. at 89l. 
150 See former INA § 244 (a) , 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994), repealed by IIRlRA, Pub. L. No. 
104-208 §§ 304 (b)(7), 309 (1996). 
15l See INA § 244(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(3), amended by IIRlRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
§ 304(a)(3). 
152 See id. 
15S See Underwood, sufrra note 47, at 893. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See Rannik, sufrra note 8, at 147. Aliens who have not been convicted of an "aggravated 
felony· can seek relief under 240 (A) (a) if they can establish (1) they have lawfully been admitted 
for permanent residence for not less than five years, and (2) have resided continuously in the 
U.S. for not less than seven years. See id. at 138-39. 
157 See Foster, sufrra note 115, at 237. "[L]ength of residence is not sufficiently calibrated to 
the strength of an alien's interest to serve as a proxy for close ties to the U.S." because often 
aliens come to the U.S. in order to be reunited with lost family members. Id. at 237. 
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more favorably than those who had been here for ten years but con-
tributed little to their community and failed to develop strong U.S. 
ties. 158 
The new "cancellation of deportation" provision significantly cur-
tails the discretionary power of the immigration judge, since the alien 
must first meet the statutory eligibility requirements and the unforgiv-
ing "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard.159 While 
it remains unclear with what degree of severity this new standard will 
be enforced, its application will most likely parallel its application 
under the old version of the INA for serious offenses. l60 Therefore, 
combining the previous 212(c) and 244(a) waivers into the single 
"cancellation of deportation" provision establishes an egregiously high 
threshhold.161 Aliens convicted of minor offenses, or who have been 
present for less than ten continuous years, will be summarily denied a 
waiver under the new laws.162 Such provisions appear to target the 
minor offender rather than the dangerous criminal, and punish those 
who have not been present illegally for long periods of time. 
c. Preclusion of Judicial Review and Habeas Corpus 
The most controversial portions of the new legislation restrict and 
eliminate federal court review of immigration law decisions by blocking 
access to habeas cOrpUS.163 Section 440(a) of the AEDPA amends sec-
tion 106(a) (10) of the INA, which allowed aliens living in the U.S. and 
facing deportation to seek federal judicial review by habeas corpus. 1M 
This was considered a fundamental right since the final deportation 
orders were made by immigration judges within the Department of 
Justice and were subject to appeal to the BIA, which was also part of 
the Department of Justice. ISS Review by an Article III court was deemed 
158 See id. 
159 See Underwood, supra note 47, at 898-900. Additionally, it is unclear whether an immi-
gration judge will continue to evaluate the "hardship" standard using the same factors promul-
gated by the BlA in prior cases. See id. at 903. 
160 See id. at 902-03. 
161 See id. at 894. 
162 See id. at 898-900. 
163 See Trevor Morrison, Note, Removed from the Constitution? Deportable Aliens' Access to 
Habeas Corpus Under the New Immigratiun Legislation, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 697, 697 
(1997). 
164 See id. at 702. 
165 See id. at 700. "Ultimately, habeas corpus functions to insure the integrity of the process 
by which the state deprives individuals of their liberty." Id. at 722 & n.137 (quoting WILLIAM F. 
DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 3 (1980)). 
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essential to the separation of powers and preserved notions of funda-
mental fairness. 166 In spite of this, section 440(a) of the AEDPA reads: 
"Any final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable by 
reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in various 
sections of INA shall not be subject to review by any court. "167 The 
IIRIRA takes this restriction one step further in its "exclusive jurisdic-
tion" provision by repealing section 440(a) of the AEDPA and adding 
section 242 (a)(2) (C) to the INA. The new section reads: "Except as 
provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of 
law ... no other court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order 
of removal." This language ensures that there is no confusion over the 
matter. 16S 
Circuit courts have skirted the issue as to whether eliminating 
access to habeas corpus review for deportation and exclusion orders 
violates the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, and the Supreme 
Court has not granted certiori on the matter. 169 While courts have 
unanimously upheld the validity of the provisions of the AEDPA and 
IIRIRA restricting judicial review, some have in terpreted these provi-
sions as preserving avenues to habeas corpus review to ensure their 
constitutionality.170 Other courts have cited the plenary power of Con-
gress over matters of immigration, suggesting that deportation is part 
of a field of government activity where "conventional safeguards of 
liberty simply do not apply."171 
The trend in the circuit court decisions is to move towards a 
loosening of the strict interpretation of the IIRIRA's "exclusive juris-
166 See id. at 700. In Heikkila v. Barber, the Supreme Court upheld congressional restrictions 
on judicial review of deportation and exclusion decisions, noting that the restrictions precluded 
review "to the fullest extent possible under the Constitution." 345 U.S. 229 (1953). The restric-
tions in this case did not interfere with the alien's right to seek habeas corpus, suggesting that 
to do so would be unconstitutional. See id. at 237. 
167 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 § 44O(a) , 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(10). 
168 See Morrison, supra note 163, at 707. 
169 See discussion infra Part III. 
170There is disagreement on this point in the Courts of Appeals. Compare Hose v. INS, 141 
F.3d 932, 935 (9th Cir.) (habeas not available), withdraum and reh'g en bane granted, 161 F.3d 
1225 (1998), Richardson v. Reno, 162 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1998) (same), and Yang v. lNS, 109 
F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997) (same), with GuncalveJ, 144 F.3d at 122 (habeas available), and 
Hendersan, 157 F.3d 117-22 (same). See also Magana-Pizano v. lNS, 152 F.3d 1213, 1220 (9th Cir. 
1998) (elimination of habeas unconstitutional), vacated and remanded and cert. granted, 119 S. 
Ct. 1137 (Mar. 8, 1999); Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210,1214 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (section 1252(g) 
removes statutory habeas, but leaves constitutional habeas intact). 
171 See Morrison, supra note 163, at 706. 
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diction" provision. This trend parallels the changing political climate 
and the pressure being exerted on the President and Congress to curb 
the law's harshest effects.172 
Illustrating this trend, the Eleventh Circuit in Auguste v. Renol73 
vacated the judgment of the Southern District of Florida which had 
granted habeas corpus relief to Herve Auguste, a French citizen or-
dered to be deported by the INS.174 The trial court granted Auguste 
habeas corpus relief on the basis that his waiver to any right to a de-
portation hearing pursuant to the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP) , 
8 U.S.C. § 1187 (1994), was not "knowing and intelligent."175 Upon 
finding that the record was "woefully inadequate to support a finding 
that Herve Auguste made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his due 
process right to deportation proceedings," the district court granted 
Auguste's petition and ordered that formal deportation proceedings 
be conducted.176 
At the time that Auguste's petition was filed, judicial review of 
deportation was governed by INA section 106, providing that "any alien 
held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial 
review thereof by habeas corpus proceedings."177 This section of the 
INA was repealed on September 30, 1996, when President Clinton 
signed the IIRIRA into law.178 The new section 242 (g) "exclusive juris-
diction" went into effect on April 1, 1997.179 Since section 242(g) 
applies "without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending or 
future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings" under the INA, 
as of April 1, 1997, no court had jurisdiction to review Auguste's 
deportation order except as provided by newly amended 8 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1252.180 
Auguste's counsel argued that the principle of separation of pow-
ers and the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause prohibit Congres-
sional elimination of judicial review. lsl The court rejected these argu-
ments based on the plenary power doctrine and reliance on the 
172 See discussion supra Part I. 
l73118 F.3d 723 (llth Cir. 1997). 
174 See id. at 724. 
1751d. 
1761d. at 724-25. 
177 Id. at 725. 
178 See Auguste, 118 F.3d at 725. 
179 See id. 
180Id. 
181 See id. at 726. 
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precedents of other circuit courts upholding the AEDPA provision 
eliminating judicial review. 182 
By applying the plenary power doctrine, the court found that 
"section 1252 'not only does not violate Article III, it is illustrative of 
the concept of separation of powers envisioned by the Constitution. "'183 
Similarly, the court dismissed the Due Process argument after briefly 
stating that "deportation of an alien is neither a criminal proceeding 
nor a punishment," such that "no judicial review is guaranteed by the 
Constitution. "184 
The D.C. Circuit concurred with the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning 
in Ramallo v. RenO.185 This case held that the "exclusive jurisdiction" 
provision of the IIRIRA was constitutional so long as habeas corpus 
remained available to aliens raising constitutional questions. 186 
The Ramallo case involved a government appeal of a district court 
ruling that enforced a cooperation agreement the government alleg-
edly entered into with Marena Ramallo, a Bolivian native, in 1986.187 
In August of 1996, Ramallo pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy 
to import cocaine and served five and one-half months in prison.188 
During the course of her subsequent deportation proceedings, 
Ramallo claimed that she entered into an agreement with the govern-
ment.189 This agreement provided that in exchange for her coopera-
tion in prosecuting drug traffickers and her waiver of objections to her 
deportability, the government would agree not to deport her and 
restore her to her status as a lawful permanent resident. l90 Conse-
quently, Ramallo filed suit in the district court to enforce the agree-
ment when the government attempted to execute her deportation 
order regardless of the prior agreement.191 The district court ruled in 
favor of Ramallo.192 The government appealed, claiming that the dis-
182 See id. The analysis used in Boston-BoUers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352, 355 (11 th Cir. 1997), 
upholding the constitutionality of section 440(a)(10) of the AEDPA, which removed all judicial 
review from final orders of deportation against aliens that committed certain offenses, "applies 
with equal force in the instant case." [d. 
185Auguste, 118 F.3d at 726 (quoting Boston-BoUers, 106 F.3d at 355). 
184 See id. (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537; Boston-Boilers, 106 F.3d at 355). 
185 See 114 F.3d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
186 See id. at 1210-12. 
187 See id. at 1211. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. 
190 See Ramallo, 114 F.3d at 1211. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
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trict court never had jurisdictional authority under the IIRIRA, which 
was passed subsequent to the district court's decision. 193 Under the 
doctrine of "residual jurisdiction," the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia vacated the district court's judgment.194 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that a statute 
which deprives 'Jurisdiction from all courts to vindicate constitutional 
rights poses serious constitutional objections," in addressing the con-
stitutionality of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the IIRIRA's 
"exclusive jurisdiction" clause.195 However, the court upheld the IIRIRA 
provision on the ground that the governmen t had conceded that 
habeas corpus review remained available to the appellee to raise sub-
stantial constitutional questions. 196 
While it appears that the D.C. Circuit has preserved the narrow 
avenue of habeas corpus for aliens facing deportation, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has gone a step further to prevent the injustice of a literal appli-
cation of the "exclusive jurisdiction" provision of the IIRIRA.197 
In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno,19B the 
Ninth Circuit created an exception to the IIRIRA's section precluding 
judicial review when the alien brings a constitutional claim.199 This 
provision allows judicial review of "only" final orders. 20o Therefore, 
under the plain language of the statute, "decisions by the Attorney 
Id. 
193 See id. 
194 See id. at 1213. 
As it is clear that we lack jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant action, 
we are faced with the question of whether we must now allow the District Court's 
decision to stand .... [W]e believe that Congress intended to afford this court 
residual jurisdiction to clear the decks of cases in which the Disuict Court has 
entered judgment, but in which there can be no review by the Court of Appeals 
due to its lack of jurisdiction pursuant to IIRIRA. 
195 Ramallo, 114 F.3d at 1211. 
196 See id. at 1214. 
197 Cf Ramallo, 114 F.3d at 1211; American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 119 
F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit decision was vacated subsequent to the writing of 
this Note pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936,142 L.Ed. 2d 940 (Feb. 1999). Certiorari was granted at 118 S. Ct. 2059, 
141 L.Ed. 2d 137 Oune 1, 1998), limited to the narrow question: "[WJhether, in light of the 
[IIRIRA] , the court below had jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's challenge to deportation 
proceedings prior to the entry of a final order of deportation." Id. The opinion of the Court 
stated that 8 U.S.C. § 1256(g), the codification of the IIRIRA's "exclusive jurisdiction" provision, 
deprived the federal court of jurisdiction, following a lengthy analysis of contradictory statutory 
language as to the retroactivity of the jurisdiction-suipping provision. See 119 S. Ct. at 946--47. 
198 119 F.3d at 1367. 
199 See 1997 WL 784545 (9th Cir.) at 1 (O'Scannlain, j., dissenting). 
200 See id. 
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General to commence proceedings and to adjudicate cases are simply 
not reviewable until the final order stage. "201 
The Ninth Circuit relied upon the "constitutional avoidance" doc-
trine in drawing out the new exception.202 This doctrine states th.at 
where a statute is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in such a way as 
to avoid any constitutional infirmities.203 By implying that the IIRIRA 
would be unconstitutional if interpreted as to effectively eliminate 
aliens' rights to judicial review, the Ninth Circuit has reduced. the 
absolute authority of the plenary power tradition in the realm of 
immigration law.204 
The dissent by Judge Q'Scannlain in American-Arab Anti-Discrimi-
nation Committee v. Reno noted that the majority decision put the Ninth 
Circuit in contradiction with the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit in 
Auguste v. Reno and the D.C. Circuit opinion in Ramallo v. Reno.205 
Today the Ninth Circuit nullifies the express intent of the 
elected branches of our government by carving out yet an-
other exception, one which is neither contemplated nor per-
mitted by the plain language of the statute. In doing so we 
are in tension with two other circuits which have addressed 
the IIRIRA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions. 206 
Justice O'Scannlain also intimated that the decision in American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno contradicted the prior de-
cision by the Ninth Circuit in Duldulao v. INS.207 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
The recent immigration legislation clearly implicates constitution-
al problems that must ultimately be resolved by a Supreme Court 
ruling that ends the war between the plenary power doctrine and alien 
rights jurisprudence.2oB The passage of the AEDPA and I1RIRA also 
201Id. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. 
204 See 1997 WL 784545 (9th Cir.) at 1 (O'Scannlain, J, dissenting). 
205 See id. 
206Id. 
207 See id. 
208 Past Supreme Court decisions hold that certain constitutional protections are afforded to 
aliens on the same grounds as U.S. citizens. See Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) 
(Congress may not impose a sentence of hard labor upon aliens illegally present in the U.S. unless 
after trial by jury); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (Fourteenth Amendment 
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reflects unwise politics and unsound policy-making.209 Advocates of the 
tougher legislation cite reasons for the reform that simply are not 
supported by the actual changes instituted.210 
By restoring the definition of "aggravated felony" to include only 
those crimes which are universally considered dangerous, the govern-
ment can continue its mission to make America's streets safer without 
passing overly-inclusive legislation.2JJ Additionally, by restoring the con-
dition that criminal aliens be subject to deportation only if they have 
actually been sentenced to one year or more for crimes of moral 
turpitude, the government would incorporate principles of fairness 
and mitigating circumstances already evaluated by ajudge in a criminal 
proceeding. This policy avoids deporting non-dangerous criminals and 
maintains administrative efficiency.212 
'Congress should also restore the section 212(c) "waiver of depor-
tation" and the section 244(a) "suspension of deportation" provisions 
in order to maintain principles of fairness and avoid instituting unjust 
hardships on aliens and families that will result from mandatory de-
portations.213 These forms of relief from deportation also reward aliens 
who have made significant contributions to society or their communi-
ties. 214 
Most fundamentally, however, the AEDPA and IIRIRA must be 
interpreted to allow deported or excluded aliens access to habeas 
corpus review by an Article III court and to secure judicial review for 
aliens who are bringing statutory or constitutional claims. This inter-
pretation must also afford judicial review to aliens who bring claims 
under the First Amendment or other provisions of the Constitution.215 
This approach will preserve the balance of power within the federal 
government structure and ensure aliens at least a minimum assurance 
of protection under the Constitution.216 To do otherwise would open 
the floodgate of Congressional power over immigration and alien 
reference to "persons" is not confined to citizens). However, these cases are usually limited to 
matters outside the context of deportation and exclusion. See The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae 
Chan Ping v. U.S.), 130 U.S. 581, 604, 609 (1889) (holding that the power to exclude aliens from 
its territory is necessary for an independent nation). 
209 See discussion supra Parts I-III. 
210 See Long Arm of Immigratiun Law, supra note 11. 
211 See Rannik, supra note 8, at 204. 
212 See discussion supra Part IIA. 
213 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
214 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
215 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
216 See generally Morrison, supra note 163. 
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rights, which in the present climate of paranoia and prejudice could 
result in many embarrassing precedents and unwarranted aberrations 
of justice.217 
CONCLUSION 
The United States has a history of blaming "foreigners" for do-
mestic troubles, and has subsequently taken political and legal meas-
ures against non-citizens that would not be tolerated if directed at 
citizens. First evidenced by the famous Alien and Sedition Acts of the 
1790s, and further illustrated by the terrors of the "communist threat" 
during the McCarthy era, blaming "foreigners" or non-citizens during 
troubled times has left the U.S. with many blemishes on its civil rights 
record. The AEDPA and IIRIRA present a great new threat to the V.S. 
civil rights tradition. Through these new laws, Congress is waging a 
virtual war against the non-citizen by exaggerating the actual threat 
posed and inciting the country with paranoia through anti-terrorism 
propaganda. By promoting and demanding fair and well-reasoned 
immigration laws, the V.S. can avoid making the same embarrassing 
historical mistakes in the new millenium. 
217 SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 834 (providing a brief history of the laws enacted in the U.S. 
during times of domestic political turmoil which restricted civil liberties and suppressed freedom 
of expression, particularly for those who did not enjoy the constitutional protection afforded to 
citizens). 
